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Executive Summary 
 
The euro area, after a poor growth performance in 2002, has stepped aside in 2003 
the word economic recovery. Concurrently, as was easily predictable since its 
inception, all the flaws of the SGP emerged once the European economy started to loose 
speed. Compared to the strongly proactive fiscal policy in the US and the UK, Europe 
remained substantially inertial, with an almost neutral policy stance. As a result, and 
despite a growth rate of 0.4 % in 2003 — as compared with 3.1 % for the US and 2.3 % 
for the UK — the area had in 2003 a much lower public deficit than these two 
countries! 
The main flaws of the SGP become then obvious: it lacks flexibility; it is asymmetric; 
it disregards the intertemporal content of public spending; it neglects the long term 
sustainability of public finance. The arguments — both theoretical and empirical — in 
favour of the SGP appear so weak that the question arises if it is not following a hidden 
agenda. 
Reform proposals have been advocated since long and they are not mutually exclusive:  
-- to focus on structural deficits 
-- to apply the golden rule of public finance, the task of defining what belongs to 
investment spending being left to the European council and to the European parliament. 
-- to take into account long term sustainability, not so much as a mean of punishing 
high debt countries, but to reward low debt ones. 
But even if all these reforms are adopted, the new SGP would at most be a second best 
solution. The real missing element is an area-wide fiscal policy actor capable of 
interacting with the ECB, so as to assure an efficient policy-mix. Even if this solution is 
not conceivable in the present political setting, it may be considered as a benchmark to 
foster both more coordination inside the European council and more reactivity (i.e. 
more growth responsibility) from its part. 
 
 
Fiscal policy in the euro area, the US and the UK: an overview 
 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is under attack from an increasing number of 
economists and policy makers. As was easily predictable since its inception, in 1997, all 
the flaws of the SGP emerged once the European economy started to lose speed. The 
prolonged stagnation, that lasts since the end of 2000 has been faced by European 
policy makers with the hands tied. A look at the data reported in table 1 is striking in 
this respect: 
 
 
Table I: Growth, deficit and fiscal impulse 
  
 2001 2002 2003 2004 
GDP Growth Rate  in % 
USA 0.3 2.2 3.1 4.5 
Euro zone 1.5 0.9 0.4 1.4 
UK 2.1 1.7 2.3 3.1 
Public Sector Balance  in % Of GDP 
USA 0.4 – 3.3 – 4.8 – 5.1 
Euro zone1 – 1.6 – 2.2 – 2.7 – 2.7 
UK 0.9 – 2.1 – 3.2 – 2.8 
Fiscal Impulse in % of GDP 
USA 0.6 3.0 1.7 1.1 
Euro zone 0.3 0.5 – 0.2 – 0.3 
UK 0.8 2.0 1.2 – 0.2 
1 Net of UMTS receipts 
Sources : Eurostat, national accounts, OFCE forecasts 04-2004 
 
 
The US authorities reacted to the slowdown with a strong expansionary fiscal policy: 
From 2001 to 2002 the fiscal balance went from a surplus of 0.4% of GDP, to a deficit 
of 3.3%. This corresponds to a fiscal impulse of 3 points of GDP. In the same year 
Europe remained substantially inertial, with a policy stance that was almost neutral (to 
become slightly restrictive in 2003).  One of the reasons for this policy inertia (that to a 
lesser extent also concerned monetary policy) is the constraint imposed on deficit 
spending by the Stability Pact. In fact, it is striking that the Euro zone has in 2003 a 
lower deficit than both the US and the UK, in spite of a much lower growth 
performance. Had Europe had comparable growth rates, we would probably observe 
much larger differences in measured deficits. In other words it appear as evident that, 
regardless of the structural differences in their economies, the fiscal policy of the US 
and the European Union differed substantially in facing the slowdown, with the former 
being far more proactive.  
 
 
On some flaws of the stability and growth pact1 
 
On these two facts – Europe was more inertial than the United States, and the Stability 
Pact is at least partly responsible for this – there is a widespread consensus among 
economists. Similarly, there is a substantial consensus on the flaws of the Stability Pact, 
in its actual formulation, that may be summarized in a few lines. 
- First, it lacks flexibility; the SGP imposes excessive uniformity of rules, between 
mature and catching-up countries, or between small and large countries regardless of 
the rate and variability of growth, of the degree of openness, of investment needs, of 
contingent liabilities and of the sustainability of public finances. 
- Second, it is asymmetric, providing no incentive to reduce expenses or to increase 
revenues during periods of strong growth. 
- Third, it disregards the public spending intertemporal features, imposing year by 
year targets even when returns (e.g. of investment) are spread over long time periods. 
Paradoxically enough it is for this reason inimical to structural reforms which 
generally imply short term costs and permanent reduction in future spending. 
- Fourth, it neglects the long term sustainability of public finances, by focusing on 
deficit rather than debt. 
 
The academic community is far from reaching an agreement on the effects of fiscal 
policy in a monetary union, and on the need to restrain for example by means of a 
stability pact. The theoretical debate develops along two lines. The first is the general 
one on the Keynesian vs. Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidations. Starting from 
the early 1990s a growing body of literature has argued in favor of expansionary effects 
of fiscal consolidations that would overcome the standard Keynesian contractionary 
effects. The bottom line of the argument is that a credible and permanent reduction of 
budget deficits may have beneficial effects on private sector expectations, and hence 
induce an increase of private expenditure (be it consumption or investment). In a 
nutshell, a fiscal consolidation may, under certain conditions, crowd in private 
expenditure and possibly more than compensate the direct negative effect of public 
spending reductions predicted by the standard Keynesian argument. 
 
More specifically targeted to monetary Unions, but equally polarized, is the debate on 
spillover effects. On one side, some argue that a government running a budget deficit 
has to borrow; in a monetary union this is supposed to raise the common interest rate, 
and to have adverse effects both on public expenditure (the area-wide increased interest 
payments reduce government consumption and investment possibilities), and on private 
consumption and investment in the other countries. This negative externality would 
induce national governments to run excessive budget deficits, allowing them to make 
the other countries pay part of `the bill'. An opposite externality argument can be 
invoked. Suppose a budget deficit expansion occurred in one country. If this were 
unwarranted, it would result in inflationary pressure, and hence in reduced 
competitiveness. On the other hand, if the deficit responded to a slump in production it 
would sustain demand and hence income and imports. In both cases, demand for the 
                                            
1 Cf. Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Briefing paper n°4, November 2002. 
other countries' production would increase, and their deficit (thanks to increased fiscal 
revenues) would be reduced. 
 
For both debates, models with one of the two effects prevailing may be easily 
constructed, so that the answer has to be found in empirical analysis. Unfortunately, 
evidence on the expansionary effect of fiscal consolidation is inconclusive as well. The 
Non Keynesian episodes of fiscal contraction are not very numerous, and often 
associated with specific factors that may have driven the result. For example, they 
almost always concern small open economies, for which the public expenditure 
multiplier was small (i.e. the Keynesian effects limited), but the competitive effect very 
strong. More on this in the following argument. Similarly, a clear-cut response on the 
sign of the externality has yet to be given. 
 
Thus, it appears clear that the case for a Stability Pact is all but established in the 
empirical and in the theoretical literature alike. 
 
The Pact has another shortcoming, linked to its one size fits all structure, that is 
becoming clearer as time goes by. In fact, the constraints on public finances imposed by 
the Pact play differently in large and small countries, with the former paying higher 
costs. A small open economy, in fact, relies more on external demand than a large one. 
As a consequence, budgetary restriction is less contractionary, and may actually be 
expansionary through fiscal competition. For large countries fiscal restraint is costlier in 
terms of foregone growth.  It is not by chance (nor by a genetic predisposition of large 
country policy makers to vice and incompetence) if nowadays most virtuous countries 
are small, and the "bad pupils" are the four largest countries of the European Union (the 
three largest countries of the euro area). That means that the allegedly anti-Keynesians 
effects of fiscal restrictions are in actuality …. Keynesians. It is not through a virtuous 
increase of private internal demand that the effect works, but through the increase of 
external demand which represents typically two third of the GDP of a representative 
small economy. 
 
 
A hidden agenda? 
 
In light of the dubious theoretical and empirical support, the strenuous defense of the 
Pact by virtually anybody (except the governments that have to deal with their 
electorates) is difficult to understand. In fact, it induces to suspect that the Pact is not 
defended per se, but rather as a means of pushing a broader and 'hidden' agenda. 
Constraining public finances, sometimes against all logic, could in fact serve the 
purpose of reducing the role of government in the economy. By depressing growth and 
employment, it would make the burden of the welfare system heavier, and thus it would 
make the reform look even more unavoidable and easier for the electorate to swallow. 
 
This would explain why the Pact is not really challenged, but raises two problems. The 
first is that a tool that had been designed to serve as a short term policy guideline is de 
facto transformed in an instrument to push for long term structural modifications of the 
European economies. The second, more important, has to do with democracy in the 
economic government of Europe. Is it correct to impose to national governments 
policies that are systematically not validated by their electorates, in the name of an 
agenda that cannot be explicitly stated because it would certainly be rejected? The latest 
Commission forecasts on public finances development in Europe show that six 
countries (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, i.e. 67% and 
88% of the EU15 and the Euro area total 2002 GDP at current prices,  respectively2) are 
expected to pass the 3% limit imposed by the treaties. 
 
What appears clearly, on the other hand, is that the Stability Pact is only one part of the 
problem, and that even scrapping it altogether would probably not be enough to 
revitalize economic policy making in the Euro area. The real missing element is an area-
wide fiscal policy actor, capable of interacting with the ECB and to assure an efficient 
policy mix as happens in the United States. Ideally, a central fiscal policy maker would 
be able to act in coordination with monetary policy to effectively manage common 
shocks. This would not only allow more efficient policy making; but it would also take 
some of the pressure off the shoulders of the ECB, that is at present the only actor 
supposed to act facing common shocks. By means of transfers a centralized fiscal policy 
would also be able to deal with region/country specific shocks (or to asymmetric effects 
of common shocks), exactly as national fiscal policy manage regional shocks. 
 
 
Reform proposals3 
 
Thus, a first best solution would certainly be substituting the Pact, that was originally 
designed as a decentralized coordination device "from the bottom", with a fully 
centralized fiscal policy authority. We may even push the argument further and argue 
that if European integration has to proceed significantly, this solution must be the 
ultimate outcome of the process. 
 
Of course the first best solution just described is not even conceivable in the present 
political and institutional conditions, and as such cannot be considered as a valid and 
realistic option for reforming the current institutional setting. 
 
The same can be said for what I see as the second best solution, namely the abandon of 
the Stability Pact, and the restoration of national control on fiscal policy. Of course, the 
problem of how to coordinate twelve (and possibly more in the medium term) national 
fiscal policies remains, especially in what concerns the relationship with the ECB that is 
centralized and almost entirely politically unaccountable. But recognizing a problem 
does not necessarily imply sticking with the status quo. It is true that the Pact works as a 
coordination device for fiscal policies in European countries. But it is actually 
coordinating them on a bad equilibrium, characterized by inertia, and procyclical fiscal 
                                            
2 And possibly seven if we take into account the limit case of the United Kingdom. (Data taken from the 
European Commission Spring forecasts, April 2004). 
3 Cf. Jean-Paul Fitoussi and Jérôme Creel : How to reform the European reform, London, October 2002. 
impulses. In these conditions, it is hard to see how the lack of coordination could 
perform worse. It is always better to have no coordination, than a bad coordination. 
 
While also politically unfeasible, the solution of scrapping the Stability Pact gives a 
guideline for assessing the reform proposals that are actually being discussed, and that 
have some chances of being actually implemented. In fact, I will rank the existing 
proposals according to the degree to which they allow national governments to regain 
control of their public finances, and to use them for an active, and countercyclical fiscal 
policy. 
 
I said that the Pact as it stands has three shortcomings: It prevents automatic stabilizers 
from acting countercyclically; it penalizes public investment, the most volatile and 
easily manageable item of public expenditures; it prevents poorer countries to increase 
public investment in order to sustain their catch-up (the problem will most probably 
become even more stringent when dealing with the accession countries). 
 
The first desirable modification, on which even the Commission agrees (since 
November 2002), is shifting the focus from total to structural deficit, thus eliminating 
all the effects given by the cycle. True, the definition of structural balance relies on a 
controversial concept, like the output gap. But the benefit of letting automatic stabilizers 
play would more than compensate the loss of immediacy of the measure. 
 
The second modification, also desirable, would be to exclude from total deficit public 
investment (the so called golden rule, or dual budget approach), in order to avoid that 
short term constraints pose problems on long term growth. The definition of what to 
include in the category of public investment necessarily implies a degree of arbitrariness, 
that risks to generate endless bargaining when discussing national stability plans. This 
problem, though, could be turned into an opportunity:  The task of precisely defining 
what belongs to the category should be given to the Council, that could use it for 
pushing towards types of expenditure that it deems useful for enhancing growth and 
competitivity (R&D, new technologies, human capital formation, and so on). More than 
laws and directives, such a power would put in place a system of incentives and hence 
could push towards a real European Policy on crucial issues. 
 
Finally, with an eye to long term sustainability, the stock of debt could be taken into 
account. This should be seen not so much as punishing high debt countries, but rather as 
rewarding low debt ones. Countries with lower-than-average debt could be given extra 
leeway, while for the others the 3% limit should continue to hold. After all, a high debt 
already limits the action of fiscal policy, by means of high interest payments. A second 
penalty would probably be more harmful than beneficial. 
 
To summarize, a reformed Stability Pact should impose convergence of structural 
deficit net of public investment. This would assure long term soundness of public 
finances, leaving room for short term countercyclical policies (at least by letting 
automatic stabilizers operate freely), and for investment aimed at increasing potential 
output. 
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